Post

Not so Limited Intervention
4th of July, 1957

As the spiraling affairs of central Africa spill over into concerning fanaticism, Rhodesia no longer can abide by idle defenses. In spite of the international coalition taking its own actions, it leaves a sour taste to how spineless the coalition seems to be an obvious effect of the Domino Theory of more and more radical ideologies spreading to its neighbors. The international community would have to accept Rhodesian intervention for what it was because too much muddling about and disrupting the flow of things in central Africa had drawn enough of an ire that even the most pacifist and non-interventionist Rhodesian would cry out "ENOUGH!"

Rhodesian Air Forces would be detached to strike directly at Angolan forces, as well as key civilian infrastructure to sap the ability of the advanced troops to maintain steady basic logistics. The bombing campaign would be led by the initial wave of B-36 Peacemakers, carrying a mixed ordinance of napalm and conventional high explosives to deal an opening blow to the infrastructure. The peacemakers would be supported by Rhodesian F-100 strike groups, targeting primarily radar instillations, oil refineries, and dams along tactically significant areas to deny the enemy easy passage.

Air cavalry would move to drop advanced infantry consisting of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, as well as a new experimental unit called the Selous Scouts. Utilizing the limited capabilities of the helicopter fleet available to the Rhodesians the plan on the ground would be vastly different to that of the current trench warfare being engaged by the Kongolese and Angolan Forces. By constantly moving, repositioning, and attacking abstract targets the ground forces intend to destroy, deny the enemy, or simply distract.

The overall Rhodesian forces have also stated to the international community a policy of "Non intercedat." Warning all but American and Australian forces that there would be direct consequences to disrupting Rhodesian operations in the area. Rhodesian forces have also been granted authority by the Rhodesian government to commandeer supplies while in the field to maintain operational status and capabilities while so deep in enemy territory. The logistical planning of heavier offensives would be left to Rhodesian high command while the situation in the ground and air is settled with more practical intelligence. Any non-identified, and non US-alligned aircraft while operating in the scope of Rhodesian campaigns will be considered as active combatants and dealt with in an appropriate manner.

Reports of ONI agents moving to the country also have been consistently denied by Rhodesian forces, but no official statement has been made.